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I. INTRODUCTION
We live in a society that never forgets. By the time one dies,
there will be a complete list of every web search he or she has
done, everything he or she has bought, every place he or she has
lived, every car he or she has owned, and so forth. This
information will be connected to each person he or she has ever
known and all of their web searches, purchase history, and so
*
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forth, by software and databases scattered across the globe. This
is so because ―[b]oth on and offline, businesses are collecting …
staggering amounts of personal information about American
citizens and compiling it into electronic dossiers designed to
predict the way people think and behave.‖1 The compilation and
aggregation of personal information is standard operating
procedure for companies and is done largely without consumer
consent.2 One commentator noted that ―[t]he extent to which an
individual‘s personal information is on display is startling: an
average American‘s information can be found in anywhere
between twenty-five and one hundred commercial databases.‖3
United States companies, which are subject only to rudimentary
data regulation, amass this information because an individual‘s
personally identifiable information has tremendous value. Even
for manufacturing businesses, the processing of information
about goods sold and the identities of customers is now just as
important as the production and shipping of the goods
themselves. Data collection companies such as ChoicePoint
make their money solely by selling ―information about
consumers to employers, marketers and others.‖4 The public at
large contributes to this system each time an individual conducts
a Google search, makes a purchase online, creates a Facebook
profile or even records a television show. The general public‘s

1
Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy
Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2003); see also
Milt Freudenheim, And You Thought a Prescription Was Private, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/business/09/privacy.html
(explaining how prescriptions and the underlying information including the patients‘
names and addresses, dosages, social security numbers, and the names of the doctors,
are bought and sold, often without the patients‘ knowledge or permission).
2
This information is also sold in the underground economy. For example, a
recent report shows that a full identity sells for between seventy cents and sixty
dollars, bank account information sells for between ten dollars and one thousand
dollars, email accounts sell for between ten cents and one hundred dollars, and credit
card information sells for between six cents and twenty dollars. See Dean Turner et
al., Symantec Internet Security Threat Report: Trends for 2008, in 14 SYMANTEC
SECURITY 82 (2009), available at
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/bwhitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf.
3
Ryan Moshell, Comment, . . . And Then There Was One: The Outlook for
a Self-Regulatory United States Amidst a Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data
Protection, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 357, 362 (2006) (citing Anna E. Shimanek, Note,
Do You Want Milk With Those Cookies?: Complying With the Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles, 26 J. CORP. L. 455, 457 (2001)).
4
ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2007, at C2;
see also ChoicePoint 1Q Profit Tumbles on Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 2008,
available at
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2008/04/25/choicepoint_1q_profit_tumbles_
on_charges/ (noting that ChoicePoint‘s total revenue in the first quarter of 2007 rose
4.9 percent to $256.4 million from $244.5 million in the year-ago period).
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behaviors and shopping habits have been turned into
commodities with little concern about the potential for abuse.
Consumers lose a large element of their privacy when they
use services as commonplace as Gmail and Amazon.com.
Google‘s Gmail may retain its users‘ emails and personal
contacts, even if the users delete that data.5 When a user clicks a
link on Amazon.com, its database retains not only the
information one might expect—things like ‗Wish Lists,‘
reviews, and records of what you purchased—but also:
the Internet protocol (IP) address used to connect [ones]
computer to the Internet; login; e-mail address;
password; computer and connection information such as
browser type, version, and time zone setting, browser
plug-in types and versions, operating system, and
platform; purchase history . . . ; the full Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) clickstream to, through, and
from [the company‘s] Web site, including date and time;
cookie number; products [one] viewed or searched for;
[ones] Auction history; and the phone number . . . used
to call [the company‘s] 800 number.6
Each time a user signs up for an account, types his or her
address, social security number, or pet‘s name, pays with a
credit card or clicks an Internet advertisement, the user
incrementally adds to his or her profile and global data footprint.
This data trail, combined with other information such as DNA
sequences, fingerprints, passport biometrics, and credit card and
banking history can create a comprehensive profile of every
aspect of an individual‘s life. Even in the offline world,
individuals generate personally identifiable data – ranging from
surveillance videos, credit card purchases, ‗shopping club‘
cards, motor vehicle records, and library records. Additionally,
computer-biometric methods are on the rise. ―[E]merging
technologies for identification of individuals include face
recognition systems, hand geometry (palm prints), voice
5

See Gmail Privacy Notice (Sept. 12, 2008),
http://mail.google.com/mail/help/privacy.html (―Residual copies of deleted messages
and accounts may take up to 60 days to be deleted from our active servers and may
remain in our offline backup systems.‖).
6
Amazon.com, Privacy Notice (Feb. 13, 2010),
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeId=468496#e
xamples. Amazon ―may also use browser data such as cookies, Flash cookies (also
known as Flash Local Shared Objects), or similar data on certain parts of our Web site
[sic] for fraud prevention and other purposes[, and d]uring some visits [it] may use
software tools such as JavaScript to measure and collect session information,
including page response times, download errors, length of visits to certain pages, page
interaction information (such as scrolling, clicks, and mouse-overs), and methods
used to browse away from the page.‖
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recognition systems, gait recognition (how a person moves), and
DNA databases.‖7
Unfortunately, and in large part due to the current lack of a
comprehensive United States data protection law, there have
been a number of breaches of databases that contain personal
information. Some of the highly publicized data breaches in the
past few years—affecting such companies as ChoicePoint,8 T.J.
Maxx,9 Discount Shoe Warehouse,10 as well as many
universities11—have been well documented. These breaches will
occur with increasing frequency as the amount of stored
personal information proliferates and legislatures continue to
forestall enacting laws compelling collectors to safeguard this
data. Experts say the general rule here is ―once information is
‗out,‘ forget about maintaining exclusive control over it.‖12
This disturbing mix of mass-storage with little oversight
results from the current ad-hoc patchwork of federal and state
legislation, as well as market failure with respect to privacy
protections. In 2008, the Identity Theft Resource Center
documented ―656 reported breaches at the end of 2008,
reflecting an increase of forty-seven percent over last year‘s
total of 446.‖13 Each year the breaches become more frequent,
7

Privacy and Cybercrime Enforcement Act of 2007: Hearing on HR 4175
Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 110th Cong. 93
(2007) [hereinafter Coney] (statement of Lillie Coney, Assoc. Dir., EPIC).
8
See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, ChoicePoint Settles Data
Security Breach Charges; to Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for
Consumer Redress, Jan. 26, 2006, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm.
9
See Brad Stone & Eric Dash, TJX Says Customer Data Was Stolen, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at C11.
10
See Eric Dash, Main Street in the Crosshairs, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 26, 2005,
at C1.
11
Susan Kinzie, Stolen Hard Drive Had Personal Data, WASH. POST, Jan.
30, 2008, at B3 (―A computer hard drive that was reported stolen from a Georgetown
University office Jan. 3 contained identifying information about 38,000 current and
former students and employees . . . .‖); Susan Kinzie, U-Va. Officials Announce
Database Breach, WASH. POST, Jun. 9, 2007, at B5 (reporting that for about 54 days,
an unauthorized hacker broke into a University of Virginia database that included
Social Security numbers and other personal information about faculty members);
Brad Stone, 800,000 Affected by Data Breach, U.C.L.A. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2006, at A28 (reporting that hackers exposed the private information of 800,000
current and former faculty, staff and students).
12
Jerry Kang & Benedikt Buchner, Privacy in Atlantis, 18 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 229, 242 (2004).
13
IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., SECURITY BREACHES 2008, available at
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/publish/lib_survey/Breaches_2008.shtml (last
visited Oct. 2, 2009); see also IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., 2008 DATA BREACH
STATS, available at
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/ITRC_Breach_Stats_Report_2008_fi
nal_1.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2009). Based on ITRC‘s categorization, the 2008
breaches break down as follows: 52.5% in the banking, credit, and financial sectors,
20.5% from medical and healthcare providers,16.5% from general business, 8.3%
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contain more data, and make available to criminals more
individuals‘ personal information, as such information is sold to
businesses and aggregated by brokers such as ChoicePoint.
Today the most profitable commodity is the data surrounding
our very existences.
Whoever dismisses the dangers of the increased availability
of personal information with the smug confidence of having
―nothing to hide‖ misses the point. Security technologist and
author Bruce Schneier addresses such an attitude as follows:
Cardinal Richelieu understood the value of surveillance
when he famously said, ‘If one would give me six lines
written by the hand of the most honest man, I would find
something in them to have him hanged.‘ Watch someone
long enough and you'll find something to arrest – or just
blackmail – with. Privacy is important because without
it, surveillance information will be abused: to peep, to
sell to marketers and to spy on political enemies –
whoever they happen to be at the time.14
We are all bound by the decisions, health problems,
mistakes, and purchases of our pasts, all of which can lead to
loss of employment, higher insurance premiums, and other
problems. Lillie Coney, Associate Director of the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, argues that lives ―are judged by the
sum total of personal information that is collected, stored,
maintained, and shared among commercial data holders.‖15 The
premise of this Article is that comprehensive federal legislation
to regulate privacy is the best way to get businesses, hospitals,
and schools to take data privacy protection seriously:
―Regulation—SOX, HIPPA, GLB, the credit-card industry‘s
PCI, the various disclosure laws, the European Data Protection
Act, whatever—has been the best stick the industry has found to
beat companies over the head with [because] regulation forces
companies to take security more seriously.‖16

from government and military sources, and 2.3% from educational institutions. These
breaches affected 219,446,406 people. Id.
14
Bruce Schneier, The Eternal Value of Privacy, WIRED, May 18, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/05/70886.
15
Coney, supra note 7, at 9.
16
Michael S. Mimoso, Bruce Schneier Reflects on a Decade of Security
Trends, SEARCHSECURITY.COM, Jan. 1, 2008,
http://www.searchsecurity.com.au/topics/article.asp?DocID=1283751&NodeID=3035
85.
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Indeed, the time has come for the United States to join the
―swing toward centralized data protection schemes.‖17 Much in
the same way the United States has stubbornly refused to adopt
the metric system, the United States is becoming an outsider in
the area of privacy legislation: ―Without legislation that
provides a solid support structure for what little government
data-protection authority exists, the United States suffers from a
general lack of enforcement that stems from industry disregard
for voluntary data-protection concepts.‖18
As long as the costs to the company remain external (in that
the user expends his or her time and money to clear his or her
identity after it has been stolen), companies will be content with
the status quo. These costs will have to become internal costs
through the ‗sticks‘ of criminal liability or civil litigation and
damages in order to make companies take serious measures to
guard personal information data.
This Article proceeds in six main parts. Part II discusses
portions of the European Union‘s Directive on Data Protection19
and argues that a similar law, akin to the EU Directive, would
benefit the United States. An exhaustive in-depth discussion of
the EU Directive is beyond the scope of this Article, but I will
summarize the key points as they pertain to a possible United
States data protection law. Part III explores the reasons why
existing United States law, such as property, contract and tort
law, is not sufficient to protect privacy interests. Part IV shows
why comprehensive data protection legislation would be a force
for good in the face of the obvious United States market failure
with respect to privacy protections. Part V describes why
creating national privacy legislation would not be cumbersome
and quickly outdated. Part VI discusses key points a
comprehensive United States policy should include.
II. THE EU DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC AND THE CURRENT
STATE OF LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the United States and the nations of
the European Union have different theoretical and practical
positions on data privacy. These viewpoints diverge, perhaps
17
Moshell, supra note 3, at 388 (arguing through a comparative analysis of
worldwide data protection standards that most of the world is moving toward
centralized data protection scheme and that, as a result, the United States is alienating
itself from the emerging active roles of other countries by adhering to its existing
data-protection regime).
18
Id. at 384.
19
See Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L
821) [hereinafter EU Directive].
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most importantly, on the issue of the appropriate level of
government intervention in the regulation of personal
information use by the private sector:
The United States uses a sectoral approach that relies on
a mix of legislation, regulation, and self-regulation. The
European Union, however, relies on comprehensive
legislation that, for example, requires creation of
government data protection agencies, registration of
databases with those agencies, and in some instances
prior approval before personal data processing may
begin.20
A. The European Union
The European Union ―adopted the Data Privacy Directive on
October 24, 1995 … [which] went into effect on October 25,
1998.‖21 The overarching goal of the Directive is to ―protect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in
particular their right to privacy.‖22 It ―was passed in response to
growing concerns about the improper use, collection, and
dissemination of personal information,‖23 and was intended to
―set forth a general framework for European data-protection law
with the intent of providing a ‗harmonized floor of protection‘
for all EU member states.‖24
The EU Directive prescribes specific requirements for the
handling, or ―processing,‖ of personal data, defined as ―any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person.‖25 Thus, an ―identifiable person‖ (the ―data subject‖ of
the personal data) is ―one who can be identified, directly or
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number
or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.‖26
20

U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR OVERVIEW,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eg_main_018236.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2009).
21
Robert R. Schriver, Note, You Cheated, You Lied: The Safe Harbor
Agreement and Its Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2777, 2784 (2002).
22
EU Directive, supra note 19, at ch. I., art. 1, ¶ 1.
23
Schriver, supra note 21, at 2778.
24
Moshell, supra note 3, at 368. But cf. The European Commission, Status
of Implementation of Directive 95/46 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to
the Processing of Personal Data,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation_en.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2009). Each Member State enacts its own legislation, which can be more
stringent than the Directive, which has resulted in varied levels of data protection
around the EU. Id.
25
EU Directive, supra note 19, at ch. I, art. 2(a).
26
Id.
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The EU Directive specifies that an individual‘s personal
information may only be collected for "specified, explicit and
legitimate purposes."27 Information collected is only kept in
identifiable form for as long as it is "necessary for the purposes
for which the data were collected or for which they are further
processed."28 Data must be accurate. If such information
becomes ―inaccurate or incomplete‖, the information must be
―erased or rectified.‖29 Thus, ―[u]nder the Directive, in the
broadest terms, personal data must not be processed without the
consent of the data subject unless that processing is necessary
for performance of a contract with the data subject or a specific
exception applies.‖30
The eight basic principles established by the directive are
―purpose limitation, data quality, data security, sensitive data
protection, transparency, data transfer, independent oversight,
and individual redress.‖31 These principles require that personal
information is only collected and used for specific purposes and
such information is stored for ―no longer than necessary for the
purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are
further processed.‖32 When data is transmitted and processed,
appropriate safeguards must be taken.33 Sensitive personal data
relating to religion, sexual preference, ethnic origin, health, and
so forth, is generally prohibited.34 This means that sensitive data
cannot be ―processed.‖35
There are exceptions to this rule. For example, sensitive data
may be processed ―for the purposes of preventive medicine,‖36
or ―for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and specific
rights of the controller in the field of employment law.‖37
Additionally, such data may be processed if ―it is authorized by
national law providing for adequate safeguards‖38 and if ―the
processing relates to data which are manifestly made public by
the data subject‖39 or ―is necessary for the establishment,
27

Id. at ch. II, § I, art. 6(1)(b).
Id. at ch. II, § I, art. 6(1)(e).
29
Id. ch. II, § I, art. 6(d).
30
Moshell, supra note 3, at 369.
31
Id. at 368.
32
EU Directive, supra note 19, at ch. II, § I, art. 6(e).
33
See Id. at ch. II, § I, art. 6(1)(b).
34
Id. at ch. II, § III, art. 8(1).
35
Id. at ch. I, art. 2(b). ―Processing‖ is defined as ―collection, recording,
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use,
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available,
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.‖ Id.
36
Id. at ch. II, § III, art. 8(3).
37
EU Directive, supra note 19, at ch. II, § III, art. 8(2)(a).
38
Id.
39
Id. at ch. II, § III, art. 8(2)(e).
28
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exercise or defence [sic] of legal claims.‖40 In certain Member
States, sensitive data—even with an individual‘s consent—
cannot be transferred.41
However, the EU Directive allows Member States to decide
whether to prohibit the voluntary disclosure of sensitive data.
Article 8(1) of the EU Directive states: ―Member States shall
prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data
concerning health or sex life.‖42 However, according to Article
8(2), this prohibition does not apply where ―the data subject has
given his explicit consent to the processing of those data, except
where the laws of the Member State provide that the prohibition
referred to in paragraph I may not be waived by the data subject
giving his consent.‖43
The overarching goal of transparency is to ensure openness
and understanding regarding the collection methods, the
intended use of data, and the identification of the data collector.
The data transfer provisions of the EU Directive limit the
unauthorized transmission of personal data to third parties
without the data subject‘s consent.44 The creation of an
independent oversight board provides an autonomous authority
with the ability to investigate data practices and enforce
sanctions against violators. Lastly, the individual redress policy
allows individuals to view their collected personal information
to ensure its accuracy. If entities or data collectors violate any
practices, individuals may pursue legal action against them.
B. United States
1. Legislation
In the 1990s, while the European Union was creating a
comprehensive data directive for its member states, the United
States was setting its own course for data privacy protection.
Around the same time that ―Europe and other governments were
developing new legal regimes to protect privacy,‖ the United
States was ―pursuing legal and technical measures to enable
surveillance.‖45 Instead of creating a comprehensive data
protection scheme, ―the United States has [so far] protected
40

Id.
Id. at ch. II, § III, art. 8(3).
42
EU Directive, supra note 19, at ch. II, § III, art. 8(1).
43
Id. at ch. II, § III, art. 8(2) (emphasis added).
44
Id. at ch. II, §II, art. 7.
45
Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of
Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 117 (2001),
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/rotenberg-fair-info-practices.pdf.
41
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personal data only in an ad hoc, sectoral manner, either
regulating specific industries or specific types of information
and then, only in reaction to specific data protection
problems.‖46 The reasons for this limited protection ―have
ranged from First Amendment concerns and the free flow of
information to the promotion of commerce and wealth, to ‗a
healthy distrust for governmental solutions.‘‖47
Instead of passing a comprehensive data protection law, ―the
United States government turned to the private sector for selfregulatory measures that offered little in the way of actual
privacy protections.‖48
The United States, however, is not totally bereft of privacy
legislation; it enacts such legislation to regulate specific
industries every few years.49 This per-industry legislating has
46

Edward C. Harris, Personal Data Privacy Tradeoffs and How a Swedish
Church Lady, Austrian Public Radio Employees, and Transatlantic Air Carriers Show
That Europe Does Not Have the Answers, 22 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 745, 746 (2007).
47
Schriver, supra note 21, at 2779 (quoting James M. Assey, Jr. &
Demetrios A. Eleftheriou, The EU-U.S. Privacy Safe Harbor: Smooth Sailing or
Troubled Waters?, 9 COMM LAW CONSPECTUS 145, 150 (2001)).
48
Rotenberg, supra note 45, ¶ 117.
49
See, e.g., Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5
U.S.C. §552a (2006) (governing the safeguarding of privacy through four procedural
and substantive rights in personal data) (amending Privacy Act of 1974); Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2006) (governing the
handling of financial information held by financial institutions); Fair Credit Reporting
Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§1681-1681x (2006) (governing the use of credit information
in consumer credit decisions); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §16921692p (governing collection of consumer debts, while promoting fair debt collection
and providing consumers with an avenue for disputing and obtaining validation of
debt information); Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§
6501-6506 (2006) (governing the online collection of personal information from
children under the age of 13); Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act of 2004, 18
U.S.C. §1028 (2006) (establishing aggravated identity theft as a new federal crime);
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006) (governing the
privacy of video tape rental, purchase, and delivery information); Driver's Privacy
Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §2721-2725 (2006) (governing the public
disclosure of personal information contained in state department of motor vehicle
records); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §1232g
(governing the privacy of student education records); Privacy Protection Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. §§2000aa-2000aa-12 (2006) (governing government access to journalist‘s
work product); Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. §227 (2006)
(governing telemarketers‘ use of certain consumer information); Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §551 (2006) (governing cable
television providers‘ use of customer information); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified with some differences in
language at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2006)) (governing the handling of financial data by
financial institutions); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) (codified with some differences in language at 15
U.S.C. §1681 (2006)) (amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act); Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191 §262 (codified with
some differences in language at 42 U.S.C. §1301 (2006)) (governing the use of
personal medical data by health professionals and health insurance providers); see
also, Better Business Bureau, A Review of Federal and State Privacy Laws, available
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resulted in the current state of patchwork regulation. There has
been no federal consensus as to whether a comprehensive data
structure would be a good for the United States, and without this
consensus, Congress must step in every few years to resolve
new privacy controversies:
Congress, state legislatures, and oversight agencies such
as the Federal Trade Commission were reluctant to enact
broad-based privacy rules, perceiving a lack of
consensus on generally accepted privacy principles and
fearing the erosion of societal benefits brought about by
new technologies and the free flow of information. To
this day, information privacy in the United States relies
heavily on individuals guarding the integrity of their data
records and protecting personal information from
unintended use.50
This piecemeal legislation by the federal government and the
states, combined with market-driven approaches by businesses,
has led to gaps, overlaps, lack of clarity, and inconsistencies.
The end result has been the loss of personal privacy:
The increasing importance of international data transfer
in the global economy, when combined with a global
trend toward comprehensive data protection, highlights
the necessity of a United States data-protection position
that contributes to, rather than detracts from, global
stability. To that end, the United States must follow the
example of nations that have established moderate
variants of the EU‘s comprehensive data-protection
framework and establish a regime that moves toward the
middle of the spectrum.51
The EU Directive is already playing an important role in the
United States economy as it restricts the flow of data to third
countries, which lack data protection laws that do not meet the
standards of the EU Directive. ―Third countries‖ in this sense
are countries outside the European Union. The EU Directive
states that personal data may be transferred to a ―third country‖
if ―the third country in question ensures an adequate level of

at http://www.bbbonline.org/UnderstandingPrivacy/library/fed_statePrivLaws.pdf
(last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
50
James P. Nehf, Incomparability and the Passive Virtues of Ad Hoc
Privacy Policy, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) [hereinafter Incomparability] (citing
James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 48-58 (2003) [hereinafter Recognizing the Societal Value]).
51
Moshell, supra note 3, at 359-360.
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protection,‖52 and such adequacy ―shall be assessed in the light
of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer.‖53 These
circumstances include ―consideration . . . [of] the nature of the
data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing
operation . . . , the country of origin and the country of final
destination, the rules of law . . . in force in the county . . . [,] and
the professional rules and security measures which are complied
within that country.‖54
When the EU Directive was first discussed, there were
concerns that trade with the United States would come to a halt
as a result of this restriction. The United States ―struck a
political compromise with the EU to ease concerns expressed by
both sides regarding potential disruptions in trade relations.‖55
This compromise came to be known as the Safe Harbor. The
Safe Harbor ―does not bind U.S. states to embrace
comprehensive privacy standards.‖56 Yet ―on the corporate level
the Safe Harbor replaces the sectoral approach by requiring
company compliance with specific principles of ‗adequate
protections‘ regarding the collection and use of personal data.‖57
The Safe Harbor was entered into in July 2000.58 Thus, ―[t]he
influence of the EU Directive upon U.S. privacy law is
noteworthy in that it represents a situation in which a
comprehensive regime, with strict standards, is finding its way
into a less strict, sectoral regime.‖59 In the past few years
various bills have been proposed in Congress—both
comprehensively and sectorally—that draw on EU Directive
standards.60 Additionally, numerous proposed and enacted state
52

EU Directive, supra note 19, at ch. IV, art. 25(1).
Id. at ch. IV, art. 25(2).
54
Id.
55
Kamaal Zaidi, Comment, Harmonizing U.S.-EU Online Privacy Laws:
Toward a U.S. Comprehensive Regime for the Protection of Personal Data, 12 MICH.
ST. J. INT‘L L. 169, 176 (2003).
56
Id.
57
Id.; see also Google Bosses on Trial in Italy, BBC NEWS, Sept. 30, 2009,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8282293.stm. Because of the
difference between United States and European Union laws, Google executives are
facing possible jail time in Italy. The case revolves around a 2006 Google Video
showing ―a teenager with Down's syndrome being bullied by four students in front of
more than a dozen others.‖ Id. The Italian prosecutors argue that ―Google broke
Italian privacy law by not preventing the content from being uploaded without the
consent of all parties involved.‖ Id. This case illustrates the challenges companies
face to comply with different international legal rules.
58
U.S. Dep‘t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 20.
59
Zaidi, supra note 55, at 175.
60
See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S.1490, 111th Cong.
(2009) (establishing ―standards for developing an implementing safeguards to protect
the security of sensitive personally identifiable information,‖ and creating civil
penalties for violations of the standards). Even more importantly, this bill would
authorize ―the Attorney General and state attorneys general to bring civil actions
against business entities for violations of this Act‖ and would establish ―in the Federal
53
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bills impose more stringent requirements on companies when
they handle personally identifiable information.61 In fact,
―specific elements of privacy protections found in the Directive
and the Safe Harbor are finding their ways into state privacy
laws.‖62
2. The FTC
Most nations have a Data Protection Board that enforces and
monitors its country‘s data protection legislation to ensure it
functions properly.63 The United States, however, has no such
Trade Commission an Office of Federal Identity Protection.‖ See also Data
Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (2009) (establishing national
standards for data breaches notifications, regulate information brokers, and requires
companies to adopt security policies.); Privacy and Cybercrime Enforcement Act of
2007, H.R. 4175, 110th Cong. (2007) (amending the federal criminal code provisions
relating to computer fraud and unauthorized access to computers, creating criminal
penalties if there is an intentional failure to provide notice of security breaches
involving personally identifiable information, authorizing additional appropriations
for investigating and prosecuting criminal activity involving computers, and
authorizing the Attorney General and state attorneys general to bring civil actions and
obtain injunctive relief for violations of federal laws relating to data security); Internet
Stopping Adults Facilitating the Exploitation of Today‘s Youth Act of 2007, H.R.
837, 110th Cong. (2007) (requiring all Internet service providers to track their
customers‘ online activities to aid police and imposing fines and prison terms of up to
one year upon anyone who fails to store that information); Eliminate Warehousing of
Consumer Internet Data Act of 2006, H.R. 4731, 109th Cong. (2006) (covering the
Internet, cable operators and any company that gathers personal information that can
identify individual consumers and acknowledging that ―Internet search engines
provide an extraordinary service, but the preservation of that service does not rely on
a bottomless, timeless database that can do great damage despite good intentions.‖);
Identity Theft Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 5482, 109th Cong. (2006) (amending the
Fair Credit Reporting Act to provide individuals the ability to control access to their
credit reports, and ―for other purposes‖); Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of
2005, S.1789, 109th Cong. (2005) (establishing mechanisms ―to prevent and mitigate
identity theft, to ensure privacy, to provide notice of security breaches, and to enhance
criminal penalties, law enforcement assistance, and other protections against security
breaches, fraudulent access, and misuse of personally identifiable information‖);
Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1408, 109th Cong. (2005) (enhancing ―data
protection and safeguards and requiring data breach notification in order to further
prevent identity theft‖); Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act, S. 715, 109th
Cong. (2005) (requiring Federal agencies and persons engaged in interstate commerce
while in possession of electronic data containing personal information to disclose any
unauthorized acquisition of such information).
61
See Holly K. Towle, Newsstand: Proliferation of Information Security
Breach Notification Statutes, Jul. 21, 2005,
http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/Detail.aspx?publication=3282 (explaining the
requirements of companies in California, Georgia, Montana, and North Dakota when
they deal with personally identifiable information).
62
Zaidi, supra note 55, at 195.
63
See generally, Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy
International, Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of Privacy Laws
and Developments (2006),
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347559552&als[theme]=Privacy%20and%20Human%20Rights%202004. In Germany,
―[t]he Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information
(Bundesbeauftragter für den Datenschutz) is an independent federal agency that
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board. Instead, ―[i]n a nation where the track record for data
privacy protections is ―spotty at best,‖ the Federal Trade
Commission (―FTC‖) has become the United States‘
beleaguered leader in advocating data privacy advances.‖64
―Data protection must therefore compete with the entirety of
U.S. commerce for FTC priority.‖65
The FTC‘s responsibility is to monitor all domestic United
States commerce—and some foreign commerce—within the
United States for any uses of unfair means of competition or
deceptive trade practices.66 The FTC does not have any specific
authority over data protection per se.67 Instead, ―[t]he FTC‘s
mission is to protect consumers from fraudulent or deceptive
claims that mislead consumers, and from harmful business
practices that undermine the competitive process.‖68 It protects
against unfair or deceptive acts and practices via Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act (―FTCA‖), which proscribes
―unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.‖69 The FTC has used this power to enforce privacy
policies.
As discussed above, most businesses, both on- and off-line,
collect personal information as a routine practice—ostensibly
under the auspices of their privacy policies. However, ―there is
no law requiring privacy policies or prescribing their content.‖
Consequently, privacy policies can offer little or no privacy
protection, and if a privacy policy is breached the individual has
little practical recourse.70
The FTC is currently serving in a reactive instead of a
proactive manner because it must ―wait until the organization
misleads the public as to those practices.‖71 Incidents of
supervises the Federal Data Protection Act as well as the Federal Freedom of
Information Act‖; in Norway, ―enforcement of the Personal Data Act of 2000 is
overseen by The Data Inspectorate (Datatilsynet)‖ which ―is placed under the
administrative wings of the Ministry of Labor and Government Administration, but is
otherwise expected to function completely independently of government or private
sector bodies‖; in Estonia, ―[t]he Data Protection Inspectorate is the supervisory
authority for the Personal Data Protection Act, the Databases Act and the Public
Information Act‖; in Sweden, ―compliance with the Swedish Personal Data Act or
personuppgiftslagen is monitored by the independent Data Inspection Board,
Datainspektionen. Id.
64
Moshell, supra note 3, at 381.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 425.
67
See Id.
68
FTC, Welcome to the Office of Policy Planning,
http://ftc.gov/opp/index.shtml (last visited June 14, 2007).
69
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
70
Nehf, Incomparability, supra note 50, at 15.
71
Moshell, supra note 3, at 429.
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misleading the public fall under the FTC‘s milieu, and the FTC
may act if and only if a company practices ―unfair or deceptive‖
practices pursuant to the FTCA.72 Absent ―comprehensive
legislation establishing fair information practice principles in the
rule of law, the FTC cannot prevent data collection and
distribution in any scenario unless the collector has posted a
privacy policy and then failed to operate under that policy.‖73
Furthermore, private parties cannot bring an action for
themselves: ―The FTCA mandates that only the FTC can initiate
and maintain court proceedings related to the matter.‖74
Even if the FTC acts, what usually happens in the best case
is that the company under investigation settles with the FTC and
the ―organization agrees to discontinue practices that violate the
FTC‘s Fair Information Practice Principles.‖75 However, ―the
commission [usually] must settle for pursuing an order
prohibiting the misrepresentation made by the organization.‖76
While there have been recent cases in which the FTC has
required companies to disgorge assets in response to their
transgressions, this is the exception rather than the rule.77
The FTC can obtain injunctive remedies. In addition, ―[f]or
some violations there may be a private remedy under state
deceptive-practices statutes, but many require proof of actual
injury, prohibit class actions, or place significant procedural
obstacles in the way of consumer redress.‖78
It does not appear that the FTC will be granted any specific
authority over data protection, nor will it advocate for
comprehensive privacy legislation. The FTC ―has developed
information practice principles, encouraged self-regulatory
measures in the private sector, and, except for a period during
72

15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
Moshell, supra note 3, at 383.
74
Id. at 425.
75
Id. at 429.
76
Id.
77
See, e.g., In Re DSW Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4157 (Mar. 7, 2006),
available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523096/0523096c4157DSWComplaint.pdf (ordering
DSW to establish and maintain a comprehensive information security program that
includes administrative, technical, and physical safeguards and requiring DSW to
obtain, every two years for the next 20 years, an audit from a qualified, independent,
third-party professional to assure that its security program meets the standards of the
order); Consent Order, U.S. v. ChoicePoint Inc., FTC File No. 052-3069 (Feb. 10,
2006) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069stip.pdf
Because of a breach resulting in compromised financial records of more than 163,000
ChoicePoint customers, the FTC settled with ChoicePoint, requiring the company to
pay $10 million in civil penalties and provide $5 million for consumer redress. Id.;
see also In re Liberty Companies, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-3891 (May 6, 1999)
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/05/lbtyord.htm (ordering Liberty Financial
Companies to post a clear and prominent privacy statement).
78
Nehf, Incomparability, supra note 50, at 15-16.
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2000 when it advocated codification of information principles,
stood as an opponent to comprehensive data-protection
legislation.‖79
3. Technological Solutions
The United States relies heavily on the individual to enact
technological solutions to protect his or her personally
identifiable information. An in-depth discussion of every
possible self-help method is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, I will briefly discuss P3P, privacy seals and user
cookie management as examples. Because of the widespread
commoditization of personally identifiable information,
―technological developments continually increase data
collection and decrease our ability to impede the process, [and
this] makes privacy protection even more difficult for people
who might be interested in curbing data collection practices by
policing their information in the marketplace.‖80 In addition,
technological solutions ―offer no privacy protection to
consumers with regard to offline data collection.‖81
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) designed P3P, or
Platform for Privacy Preferences, in order to make website
practices ―explicit and thus open them to public scrutiny.‖82 P3P
allows a user to set a data privacy threshold and ―to automate
decision-making based on these practices [sic] when
appropriate.‖83 Internet users, therefore, ―need not read the
privacy policies at every site they visit.‖84 If a website has a
privacy policy in conflict with the user‘s data privacy threshold,
then the user is alerted by a warning.85 Such warnings ―may take
different forms—for example pop-up messages that require the
user to make a decision, or icons in the corner of the browser
window that do not require user action.‖86 Critics have been
unenthusiastic about P3P partly because ―P3P places the onus
on computer users to set their privacy preferences, which given
the limited technical knowledge and awareness of most users, is
bound to limit the impact of P3P.‖87 In addition, there is a lack
of enforcement with P3P self-help because ―[n]o law or
79

Moshell, supra note 3, at 381.
Nehf, Incomparability, supra note 50, at 27.
81
McClurg, supra note 1, at 92.
82
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project, Nov. 20, 2007,
http://www.w3.org/P3P.
80

83
84

Id.

Id.
85
What is P3P and How Does it Work?,
http://p3ptoolbox.org/guide/section2.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
86
Id.
87
McClurg, supra note 1, at 93-94.
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regulation requires Web sites to adopt P3P, nor does any
enforcement mechanism exist to ensure that P3P-compliant sites
actually follow their privacy policies.‖88
In short, P3P protocols ―are complex, difficult to implement,
and unlikely to enable consumers to protect privacy[,]‖89 and,
―while P3P is a step in the right direction, it is by no means a
panacea to protecting information privacy.‖90
Another self-help method the market has implemented is the
privacy seal program. Two such programs are the TRUSTe and
the BBBOnline Privacy Seal, ―[both of] which rate the privacy
policies of Web sites, providing sites that post clear privacy
protection policies with a seal of approval.‖91 These methods are
also inadequate, however, in part because:
At present, market incentives do not push trust mark
licensors to impose rigorous privacy policies on their
licensees. While a licensor will insist on a minimally
acceptable privacy standard to make its mark appear to
have value, insistence on rigorous standards is likely to
drive away licensees who prefer laxer standards. What
people need is a signal for determining whether a trust
mark itself is a meaningful signal. Without mandatory
privacy standards to ensure that a mark is worth
something – for example, minimum requirements for
displaying a privacy ―seal of approval‖ – signals will
remain ineffective bridges of the information gap.92
Another option individuals have to protect their personally
identifiable information online is to disable cookies in their
Internet browser. Cookies are ―small files that Web sites put on
your computer disk drive when [one] first visit[s].‖93 Cookies
store user information such as preferences, user names,
personalized pages, and passwords, so that when an individual
returns to a page with cookies enabled, the user does not need to
reenter a password or reset personalized settings. All web
browsers have the ability to set, block, or warn users about
cookies. This self-help method has one major drawback,
however in that ―the individual is responsible for coordinating
88

Id. at 94.
Rotenberg, supra note 45, at 76.
90
McClurg, supra note 1, at 95.
91
Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of Online
Privacy Legislation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 110 (2002).
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Nehf, Incomparability, supra note 50, at 25 (footnote omitted).
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Microsoft, What is a cookie?,
http://www.microsoft.com/protect/terms/cookie.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
89

18

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 1:18

all the different aspects of her privacy protection.‖94 Despite the
public being generally informed about private information
collection methods on the Internet, and the fact that in 2007
there was ―a huge surge in public anxiety over information
security,‖95 people are still unaware of how best to protect
themselves. A recent survey of Internet users in the United
States ―revealed that although Americans are aware that their
Internet behavior is subject to commercial monitoring, less than
half of [them] know what a cookie is, and even fewer know how
to take the short, simple steps to set their web browsers to
prevent the placement of cookies.‖96 In addition, personally
identifiable information is increasingly gathered in other ways,
such as browser plug-in vulnerabilities, phishing, and tracking
done at the Internet Service Provider level.97 Thus, even a
diligent person who monitors cookie files may not be protected.
Moreover, for some websites, cookie usage is mandatory. If the
cookies are not enabled, the user cannot use the company‘s site.
III. WHY CONTRACT, TORT, AND PROPERTY LAW DOES
NOT PROTECT PRIVACY
Critics of a comprehensive data protection law often argue
that there is no need for special private data legislation because
there are common law standards in place—contract, tort, and
property law—for Internet users to redress any problems that
arise. However, these standards fail to protect users‘ private
data. The chief reason for this failure is the fact that consumers
do not always know when their data privacy has been breached
until it is too late:
To a large extent, we are operating in a fog when
attempting to analyze the privacy implications of
consumer data profiling, because so little is
94

Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 91, at 136.
Privacy International, PI Warns That Breaches are Leading to Collapse
of Public Trust in IT Systems, Jan. 20, 2008,
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347559869&als[theme]=Data%20Protection%20and%20Privacy%20Laws.
96
David A. DeMarco, Note, Understanding Consumer Information Privacy
in the Realm of Internet Commerce: Personhood and Pragmatism, Pop-Tarts and SixPacks, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1013, 1019 (2006); see also PEW Internet & American Life
Project, PEW Internet Posts, Nov. 29, 2004,
http://www.pewinternet.org/Commentary/2004/November/Surprising-strange-andwonderful-data.aspx (―56% of online Americans do not know what a cookie is.‖).
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See Symantec, SYMANTEC GLOBAL INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT:
TRENDS FOR 2008, Volume XIV (April 2009), available at
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/bwhitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf (discussing
increased security threats).
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known about it. The actual analytical processes
of data mining are largely impenetrable as a
technical matter, and they occur within an
industry that does little to facilitate public
scrutiny of its practices.98
The average Internet user does not typically know what
information is being collected about him or her, to whom it is
being sold, or how it is being shared. The public, moreover,
only hears about a fraction of the data breaches. Thus, ―[e]xcept
in the rare instance when a privacy breach comes to someone‘s
attention, people will never learn about harms resulting from
information collection and misuse.‖99 Even if there is a breach
of an individual‘s online privacy, that individual may never
become aware of it:
The vast majority of data collecting—lawful and
unlawful—occurs outside public view. Individuals do
not know when information collection and sharing has
affected them for good or for bad. If a breach of privacy
norms results in media exposure, identity theft, or some
other cognizable injury, the affected person may learn
about it in due course. Less obvious breaches remain
hidden for long periods, possibly forever.100
Even if an individual knows a breach has occurred, it may
be difficult to show that there has been harm from that breach. It
is particularly difficult, for example, for an individual to prove
that identity theft happened from a particular breach. Identity
thieves need only breach a single database to get an individual‘s
name, social security number, credit card number, date of birth,
and so forth. If one is a shopper at Discount Shoe Warehouse
whose information has been aggregated by ChoicePoint, it may
be impossible to determine which breach was at fault. The harm,
moreover, may have resulted from a recent data breach or from
one that happened years before, where the perpetrator ―sat‖ on
the information until it could be used:
Even with an obvious injury such as identity theft, it may
be impossible to learn how the thief obtained the
personal information. The thief might have taken Social
Security numbers from a university database, driver‘s
98
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license numbers from a convenience store scanner,
addresses from an insurance company, or credit card
numbers from the marketing affiliate of a credit card
issuer. Tracing the injury back to the point of origin will
often be difficult or impossible.101
Thus, if an individual cannot show an individualized harm, it
is difficult if not impossible to bring a contract, tort or property
claim against an entity, because the individual is missing an
integral part of any such claim.
It is unlikely that the enactment of comprehensive data
protection legislation would change this problem. Criminal or
civil liability only attaches if wrongdoing is found. Thus, the
creation in the United States of a Data Protectorate Board, as the
EU Directive calls for,102 would go a long way toward helping
the government uncover activities, which contravene the
protection legislation.103
A. Property
Critics and commentators have suggested creating a property
right in personally identifiable information.104 Despite
―numerous creative academic proposals for creating property
rights in personal information, current case law provides that
while individuals have no property rights in their personal
information . . . [,] customer information databases are generally
viewed as property of the firms that hold them.‖105 In addition,
―[c]reating a property right in personal information would
amount to the recognition of a new form of intellectual property,
101

Id. at 28.
EU Directive, supra note 19, at ch. VI, art. 28.
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See, e.g., Data Protection Bill of 1991, H.R. 685, 102d Cong (1991)
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L.J. 1183 (2002); Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value, supra note 50, at 68-69;
Michael P. Roch, Filling the Void of Data Protection in the United States: Following
the European Example, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 71, 94
(1996).
104
See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE 142-63 (1999) (advocating the use of property rights to protect privacy
on the Internet); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1193 (1998) (suggesting a statutory solution that is market-driven or
property-esque); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An
Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383-84 (1996) (arguing that
"personal information, like all [other] forms of information, is property‖); Pamela
Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2000)
(describing consumer data as ―a key commercial asset‖); Paul M. Schwartz, Property,
Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2095 (2004) (suggesting a
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but it would be much broader and more ambiguous than
currently recognized intellectual property rights.‖106
Granting individuals a property right in their personally
identifiable information ―would allow the market—made up of
buyers, sellers, and competition—to determine the most
efficient allocation of this valuable property interest.‖107 The
existence of such a property right creates the potential for
individuals, who feel a company‘s requests are too intrusive or
that they are not getting enough value from their personally
identifiable information, to withdraw or ―withhold their valuable
PII [personally identifiable information] and move to a
competitor's product that is less privacy intrusive.‖108
This idea has pitfalls for the individual: ―[I]f people do not
know what information is being collected, how it could be used,
and what harm might result from its collection and use, they
have no way of judging how much it is worth (in time, effort, or
money) to keep the information private.‖109 Additionally,
without standards requiring companies to adhere to certain
privacy policies, including data aggregators, ―[e]ven if asked,
the data collector cannot provide enough information to give the
individual a meaningful choice.‖110 Creating property rights in
personally identifiable information would not enable an
individual to protect his or her data from being processed and
sold. Once a company has a user‘s personally identifiable
information, it is impossible to determine whose hands it may
end up in. The difficulties users face in proving which company
caused the breach and in proving harm further hinder any
attempt to bring a cause of action.
Creating a property right in personally identifiable
information raises the question of whether the individual user or
the company owns the data. The creation of such a property
right is difficult because ―[one] can‘t simply build a fence
around [one‘s] personal information to keep others away from it
[and] although [one] notice[s] when somebody has taken away
[one‘s] car, [one] usually [has] no way of knowing when
somebody has taken [ones] data.‖111 Furthermore, personally
identifiable information would be a fundamentally intangible
form of property; it could exist in different forms and in
different places at the same time. The use of personally
106
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identifiable information by one person does not destroy the
property, deprive the individual from using the information, or
even prevent others from using it at the same time. This aspect
of such information is a primary cause of its excessive
proliferation.
B. Tort
Tort law has also been proposed as a way to protect privacy.
However, ―[C]ourts have long rejected assertions that torts such
as intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of embarrassing
facts, and appropriation of name and likeness ought to be
extended to the consumer information privacy context.‖112 In
addition, as one commentator pointed out, the rejection of tort
law is ―generally . . . not grounded in philosophical objections to
tort law, but in the pragmatic—and largely accurate—view that
current tort law simply is not well suited to address information
privacy abuses.‖113
Privacy torts seek ―to protect individuals from reputational
harm[,]‖114 not to ―protect an individual‘s sense of autonomy
and to prevent potential losses due to misuse of information.‖115
Because of this distinction, privacy torts are ill-equipped to
―have much impact on DNA or medical databases since the data
are either extracted with consent, or in circumstances such as
arrests, where consent is not an issue.‖116 In addition, ―privacy
torts do not protect things in public view on the theory that such
things are, by definition, not private.‖117 This means public
tracking through video surveillance, gait, and voice recognition
are not covered by a privacy tort, since these are activities in the
public view. Privacy tort law only protects a very narrow class
of privacy—a class, which wholly excludes the overarching
privacy concerns facing today‘s online world.
C. Contract
Professor Eugene Volokh has advanced a contract theory for
protecting information privacy that would permit consumers to
enforce, through breach of contract actions, promises not to
reveal information.118 Volokh ―went further and suggested
112
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legislatively imposed default rules that would specify certain
transactions as carrying with them an implied promise of
confidentiality [that] could be waived by agreeing to a
disclaimer that any information was not subject to
confidentiality.‖119
However, ―for Volokh‘s contract model to confer
meaningful protection for the privacy of consumer data on a
widespread basis, legislatures would be required to adopt the
theory and enact his proposed implied-contract-ofconfidentiality default rules.‖120 Convincing the legislature and
the courts to implement a contractual right to privacy may prove
no less onerous a task than winning the legislature‘s backing for
a more comprehensive data protection scheme.
There is ―a dearth‖ of contract claims of this nature thus far,
perhaps because of ―the somewhat attenuated relationship
between a privacy policy and the typical contractual transaction
(i.e. the sale of goods or services) to which such an executory
policy might attach.‖121 Contract claims are rare, furthermore,
because ―damages for any such breach, on the individual level,
would be prohibitively low, or alternatively, too difficult to
quantify.‖122 Additionally:
―It‘s extremely tough to keep track of personal
data in secondary transfers. In other words, even
if the info is properly used by the first party,
when that party conveys the info to party number
two, it‘s hard for the individuals to verify
whether that second party is using the info in
accordance with the license, permission, or
authorization connected to that data. As a
practical matter, once information is ‗out,‘ forget
about maintaining exclusive control over it.123
The implementation of a comprehensive data protection
privacy scheme does not mean that the days of collecting and
aggregating personally identifiable information are over. Indeed,
―[i]n many situations, consumers have privacy preferences, and,
if forced to evaluate privacy terms, consumers would in fact
give up some personal information in exchange for added
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value.‖124 On the other hand, some individuals would
―sometimes pay more or give up discounts to have better
privacy protection, as many refuse grocery store ‗convenience‘
cards because they do not want their purchasing habits tracked
and traded.‖125
In addition, there is a power inequality between businesses
and individuals:
Confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it situation, an
individual may lack any practical ability to negotiate
privacy terms. After all, the entire point of a form
contract is to gain the efficiencies of standardization.
Moreover, a company might be the only provider of the
goods or services required. In order to obtain a certain
benefit, the consumer has no choice but to accept the
company‘s terms even if they require the disclosure of
personal information as a necessary prerequisite.126
In this type of situation a consumer must accept the terms on
which the service is being offered, for ―[i]n the marketplace,
personal data will be lost in the shuffle, with citizens making
bad choices or being coerced into transactions from which they
cannot walk away.‖127
IV. WHY LEGISLATION TRUMPS FREE MARKET – MARKET
FAILURE
The main argument against a comprehensive data regime in
the United States is that sectored legislation and self-regulation
are considered the least restrictive methods. In addition, critics
claim that ―[l]egislative attempts to regulate the specific
technological aspects of information privacy are likely to be
clumsy and to become quickly outdated.‖128 Instead, these
critics contend that ―letting the market decide [gives] . . .
citizens . . . the power to choose ‗their optimal mix of privacy‘
without paternalistic intervention from the state.‖129 This theory
advances the idea that the market is the most effective way to
protect the privacy of Internet users. The market itself, however,
has not vindicated this stance. Current American privacy policy
124
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―reflects what industry is prepared to do rather than what the
public wants done.‖130
In reality, ―[t]he market incentives are weak . . . and the
conditions of market failure are strong‖131 because the United
States demands no real accountability for companies that
disclose information, and, ―[w]ithout accountability, market
forces cannot effectively curb harmful behavior.‖132 Even media
exposure does not provide adequate accountability. There have
been ―a number of . . . examples of the press uncovering
corporate information sharing plans that generated public
outrage[,]‖133 and such stories provide ―a fast, low cost method
for unhappy consumers to protest.‖134 However, this oversight is
not always effective because breaches are not always disclosed
or even reported.
Currently, the only way to bring a claim is through contract
or tort as discussed above. The FTC can prosecute businesses,
but may only do so if a business acts contrary to its privacy
policy. An individual, however, cannot bring a claim on his own
behalf.135
A. Control
Legislation is needed to give people a certain level of
control over their personal data, so that they may dole it out or
keep it processed to a minimum as they see fit. However, some
personal data is too important to barter away – such as genetic
data, biometrics, and health-related data. For this type of
information, people should not be able to grant access, such as
in the EU Directive art. 8(2). Such a prohibition should not, for
example, prevent processing of data when it ―is required for the
purposes of preventive medicine, medical diagnosis‖ or when it
―is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence [sic] of
legal claims‖ or ―where the data subject is physically or legally
incapable of giving his consent.‖136 In these exceptional cases,
the information should be processed and collected under stricter
circumstances and with ―suitable safeguards.‖137

130

Rotenberg, supra note 45, at ¶ 119.
Nehf, Incomparability, supra note 50, at 19.
132
Id., at 27.
133
Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 91, at 108.
134
Id. at 110.
135
Nehf, Incomparability, supra note 50, at 27 (―For individuals to protect
their privacy interests, they must be able to identify the culprit who broke a
law, breached a voluntarily adopted privacy policy, or allowed access to a
database because of lax security procedures.‖).
136
EU Directive, supra note 19, art. 8 (2) and (3).
137
EU Directive, supra note 19, art. 8 (4).
131

26

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 1:26

Even with more mundane personally identifiable
information, ―the market approach provides too little control
over personal data,‖138 partly because the United States‘ privacy
policies are based on an opt-out regime, rather than an opt-in
system.
This opt-out regime has a number of problems. One problem
is that ―[b]ecause personal information is valuable, easily
collected, and often free; companies have strong incentives and
virtually no disincentives to collect as much of it as they can.‖139
Having an opt-out regime means that certain people, mainly
those who are not savvy enough to read the privacy policies and
opt-out of the collection, will be at a disadvantage.
Another problem is that ―[i]f people are only vaguely aware
of a data-sharing activity, they cannot evaluate the extent of any
potential injury, and it is difficult for them to take protective
measures or to stop the activity from recurring.‖140 A self-help
system assumes that individuals will be diligent in defending
their privacy rights and that they have the ability to value their
privacy rights meaningfully. For such an assumption to be
warranted, the population must be sufficiently educated to be
able to ―make . . . informed choice[s] about whether and how to
share information, and whether to take the time or spend the
money to protect it.‖141 Because individuals do not know what
happens to their personally identifiable information after it is
given out, or how it is combined with other aggregated data, ―it
is difficult to assess the risks associated with releasing
information or failing to monitor its use after its release.‖142
B. Privacy Policies
Just about every business has a privacy policy. By buying an
item, consumers tacitly agree to the seller‘s privacy policy.
Sometimes, consumers actively agree to these policies, for
example, by clicking ―I agree‖ or clicking on a radio button
stating that the consumer has read and understood the privacy
policy and user terms and agreements. Privacy policies of
businesses suffer several weaknesses: They lack uniformity,
―they are cryptic or in small print no one reads, and [they are]
subject to unilateral change.‖143 Moreover, ―an individual
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cannot easily determine the actual consequences of
disclosure.‖144
The consumer has little to no choice in the matter. If one
wants to buy something from a business or read articles from a
newspaper, one must agree to its privacy policy. There is no
opportunity or ability to negotiate with the company. These
privacy policies, in short, are contracts of adhesion, which
provide only ―a limited range of means for consumer
redress.‖145
V. WHY NATIONAL LEGISLATION IS THE BEST OPTION
Federal legislation which would set a floor for privacy in the
United States is the best way to resolve difficulties created by
market failure, the confusion of competing state laws, and the
inability of individuals to bring tort, contract and property
claims. It would provide individuals and businesses with the
best incentives to address and correct data privacy problems
currently plaguing the United States.
The current piecemeal legislation, and the market-driven
approaches that businesses have taken, have lead to gaps,
overlaps, and inconsistencies among the different approaches.
Since the Internet is not contained within one state or country,
legislation has potential cross-border implications. As different
states enact legislation, there is often no uniformity between key
terms. For example, ―key terms like ‗personal information‘ are
not consistently defined, creating discrepancies as to whether a
company must disclose a security breach.‖146 Federal statutes
also contain their own definitions for key terms, further
compounding this confusion. A comprehensive privacy statute,
however, would bring all these different competing statutes into
alignment, creating uniform definitions and legal standards and
eliminating inconsistencies.
Without a comprehensive privacy statute in place, market
forces have stepped into the void.147 As discussed above, the
market has proven itself to be insufficient in solving the
problems of Internet privacy. A uniform federal privacy law
would be a boon to companies as well as individuals, as there
would be one standard to apply across the country, eliminating
144
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the conflicting standards that led companies to enact different
security measures to avoid liability on a state-by-state basis. The
current mélange of legislation and market forces ―poses a threat
to the viability of data collecting businesses [which] transforms
the statutes from tools that foster useful market forces in terms
of stimulating more responsible data into misfits that produce an
environment of uncertainty, undermining companies‘ efforts to
comply.‖148 It would be in a business‘s own interest to support
the passage of a comprehensive privacy regime, because such a
regime would simplify the legislative minefield that business
currently must traverse.
With increasing attention being given to privacy issues,
states have stepped into the void left by the federal government
and have begun enacting their own legislation.149 As each state
enacts its own legislation, with its own definitions and
standards, businesses will face increasing complications in
adhering to each individual state‘s legislation. This patchwork
of state legislation will make ―it difficult to establish a baseline
privacy standard that consumers and businesses alike can
follow.‖150
In addition, the general public is not only becoming more
interested and concerned about how personally identifiable
information is used, but also supports comprehensive reform.
Sixty-nine percent of respondents to a recent survey believe that
―there should be a law that [gives] people the right to know
everything a Web site knew about them.‖151 In the same survey,
ninety-two percent of respondents supported a ―hypothetical law
that [would require] Web sites and advertising companies to
delete all information about an individual upon request.‖152
Some critics of a national privacy law believe consumers
should allow businesses to collect, aggregate and analyze their
private data, because ―(1) these data actually do some good, (2)
the harm is actually not very great, and (3) no one spends money
collecting these data to actually learn anything about you. They
want to learn about people like you.‖153 Furthermore, these
critics warn that without the ability to collect and aggregate
personal information, there will be higher marketing and
distribution costs, as well as fewer new services and products
because of the higher cost of introducing these to the public at
148
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large.154 This ―parade of horribles,‖ however, is not likely to
happen, as the example of Europe amply demonstrates:
We see Europeans happy to use bonus cards and
frequent traveler programs to receive discounts.
They do not seem especially hesitant to disclose
personal data in exchange for a free e-mail
service or the chance to take part in a lottery.
They are willing to sell their privacy for a couple
of Euros, as are Americans for a couple of
dollars.155
What the critics fail to recognize is that ―data protection
legislation is about the protection of individuals rather than the
regulation of industry [and that it] is civil rights legislation
rather than technical business legislation.‖156 Privacy advocates
do not seek to hinder companies from conducting business but
to protect private personal data.157
Another criticism is that ―adopting a European-style privacy
policy may not fit with [American values such as] our
constitutional traditions regarding free speech, our trust in the
efficiencies of competitive markets, and our suspicion of
government-imposed solutions to private-sector problems.‖158
The difference between Europe and the United States with
regards to privacy ―can in fact be traced to the reality that the
United States, unlike most Western European nations, does not
have a literal constitutional basis for the treatment of privacy as
a fundamental right.‖159 Although free speech is an explicit right
guaranteed by the United States Constitution,160 the right to
privacy is an implicit right guaranteed by the Constitution as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.161 The United
154
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States Constitution grants citizens a right to privacy from
government intrusion, but does not provide for a general right to
privacy from private individuals. In contrast, many other
countries have statutory162 or constitutional163 rights to personal
privacy, which are enforceable against private individuals and
entities as well as the government. In some countries, personal
privacy is ―viewed as a fundamental human right grounded in
the dignity of the person.‖164
While the background of privacy law in the European Union
is different from that of the United States, it is possible to create
an omnibus privacy statute like the EU directive, which would
be compatible with American cultural values. It is true, for
example, that the EU Directive may have created freedom of
speech issues within the European Union.165 However, there are
ways to protect this country‘s explicit freedom of speech values
while also protecting peoples‘ private data. Congress could
consider holding ―[c]ommercial actors . . . to higher standards in
the handling of citizens‘ personal data while allowing individual
citizens not engaged in commercial or professional activities to
use and disclose personal data on others.‖166 Furthermore, if
―there is a commercial component to an individual citizen‘s
personal data processing, they would then be subject to the
higher standard just as any other commercial actor is.‖167 The
protection of personal privacy does not seriously conflict with
any provision of the Constitution.
Other critics have cautioned against rushing too hastily to
pass a national privacy law.168 Their ―passive approach carries a
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price.‖169 The longer the United States waits to enact privacy
legislation, the longer it leaves individuals‘ privacy interests
vulnerable to invasion while providing those individuals little to
no legal recourse. In addition, when the sectoral manner of
privacy legislation is allowed to persist, businesses and
individuals will come to solidify their ―attitudes about privacy . .
. thus making it more difficult to change the status quo and
initiate sweeping reforms at a later time.‖170
The United States need not fear that a comprehensive data
protection scheme would quickly become outdated. The EU
Directive, which was passed in 1995 and enacted by member
states in 1998, debunks the claim that privacy legislation always
becomes outdated and outmoded quickly. Indeed, the OECD
Guidelines171 were created in 1980 and have so far withstood
the test of time. A general floor for privacy can weather and
grow with the ongoing technological changes that increasingly
impact personal privacy.172 At the very least, a ―comprehensive
form of privacy protection will . . . act as a benchmark from
which interested parties and relevant authorities may curb the
misuses of online personal data.173
The United States should learn from the missteps taken by
the European Union (such as problems with enforcement) and
create a better system: ―[L]egislation would probably not be
effective in controlling information privacy unless it created a
strong incentive for someone to enforce it.‖174 There are other
lessons to be learned from foreign privacy legislation of which
the United States can and should be mindful while crafting its
own.
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VI. WHAT PROPOSED LEGISLATION SHOULD INCLUDE
The United States has its own historical reasons for lacking
expressed, written constitutional or statutory provisions
protecting privacy. Any comprehensive data privacy legislation
in the United States, therefore, would need to be different from
the European Union‘s privacy laws.
One of the things a comprehensive United States data
privacy scheme should take from the EU Directive is the bar on
exploiting sensitive data including ―racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union
memberships, and the processing of data concerning health or
sex life.‖175 This restriction would have a huge impact. The
United States Census, for example, asks questions about racial
and ethnic origin as well as religious or philosophical beliefs by
inference. However, even with an omnibus privacy statute,
legislation could make an exception to the rule for the census, or
the census itself could ask each participant if he or she will
consent to having his or her information gathered and processed,
thus complying with a comprehensive data privacy scheme.
Furthermore, the statute might place restrictions on what the
government could do with the information after collecting it.
For instance, it could provide that census information only be
non-identifying information or that census information only be
aggregated and reported after any personally identifying
information has been stripped out.
The United States should also incorporate into the
legislation the idea that ―transfers of personal data to third
countries‖176 must ―ensure an adequate level of protection‖177 or
else ―be prohibited.‖178 There is little point in enacting
comprehensive data privacy legislation, which permits the
outsourcing of data retention to a country that provides little to
no privacy safeguards.179
175

EU Directive, supra note 19, art. 8 (1).
EU Directive, supra note 19, ¶ 56.
177
Id.
178
EU Directive, supra note 19, ¶ 57.
179
E.g. Rachel Konrad, Foreign Accountants Do U.S. Tax Returns, USA
TODAY, Feb. 4, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/200402-23-overseas-outsourcing_x.htm. Sometimes workers in other countries attempt to
use the information to get higher wages or additional money. For example, in October
2003, a medical transcription subcontractor in Pakistan sent an email with attached
patient files to the University of California San Francisco Medical Center demanding
payment. See Jay Fitzgerald, Known Around the World, Private Records May Be at
Risk, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 30, 2003, at 27; David Lazarus, Extortion Threat to
Patients' Records: Clients Not Informed of India Staff's Breach, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 2,
2004, at A1; see also David Lazarus, Looking Offshore: Outsourced UCSF Notes
Highlight Privacy Risk: How One Offshore Worker Sent Tremor Through Medical
System, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2004, at A1.
176

2009]

COMPREHENSIVE DATA PRIVACY LEGISLATION

33

The collection of personally identifiable information should
be on an opt-in, rather than an opt-out system. Before the
proliferation of cheap storage devices and before the rise of the
Internet, transactional costs associated with an opt-in regime
were prohibitive. However, ―these costs may go to zero in the
online world, and if that is the case then the economic argument
against opt-in should be revisited.‖180 Society has now reached
this point, and any comprehensive data privacy legislation
should require an opt-in rather than the current opt-out
approach. The EU Directive takes such an approach by stating
that ―Member States shall provide that personal data may be
processed only if . . . the data subject has unambiguously given
his consent.‖181
In addition, individuals should be provided contact
information so that they can access, modify, update, or remove
their personally identifiable information from a company‘s
records. The process of removing oneself from the company‘s
records should be simple and fast. Companies should be banned
from requiring individuals to fill out complex forms, mail them
in, and then wait for weeks or months while the company makes
changes.
Furthermore, individuals should be notified of ―the purposes
of the processing for which the data are intended.‖182 The EU
Directive sets forth this standard in Article 10.183
A comprehensive data scheme should take specific care not
to tread on the strong First Amendment protections governing
the freedom of speech. However, legislation should not allow
―business interests that gather personal data and seek to protect
that information under the First Amendment [to] pervert the idea
of ‗commercial speech‘ which was designed to protect
consumers.‖184
Any legislation should also recognize the failures of the
FTC‘s role and create a strong incentive for people to police
how companies use and retain their personally identifiable
information. Perhaps the legislation could create both a criminal
and a private right of action.185 Allowing a private citizen to
bring an action would make businesses more likely to comply in
180
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the face of potential lawsuits. This incentive to comply would
help turn the external costs of privacy security into internal costs
for the company by making ―it bad business for them not to
care.‖186
Any legislation should not regulate privacy matters based on
whether an issue arises online or offline. Information privacy
arises in both the online world—through purchases, movie
rentals, email sign-ups—and in the offline world of doctor‘s
appointments, grocery purchases, and traffic tickets.
Any legislation should also mandate disclosure to the public
and to the individuals whose security may be compromised in
the event of a breach. It should not matter whether the company
thinks there is a risk of identity theft; disclosure should be
mandatory. A disclosure requirement may have the positive
effect of publicly shaming a company ―into improving its
security.‖ 187
Finally, the law must not be so watered down as to be
ineffective. Many states have enacted privacy legislation188 and
breach legislation.189 Federal law should not offer lesser
protections than those already in place around the country,
thereby preempting more effective state laws.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The time has come for Congress to enact comprehensive
data privacy legislation for U.S. citizens, covering data
acquisition, retention, and reuse. The current piecemeal, ad-hoc
smattering of legislation and self-help remedies have done little
to stem the tide of identity theft and lost records. This approach
has failed to lessen the widespread aggregation and
commoditization of personally identifiable information.190
A comprehensive data privacy scheme is needed because the
market has proven insufficient at sorting out optimal privacy
protections, which are of real benefit to anyone at the consumer
level. In addition, the traditional common law remedies of tort,
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contract, and property law are currently inadequate to protect
privacy interests. The patchwork regulation and self-help
methods available to individuals today do not do enough to limit
improper uses of personally identifiable information.
Federal legislation is the best way to overcome the above
problems. Congress can make policy decisions for the country,
and it has the ability to create committees to study such
problems and potential solutions. Indeed, ―[c]onventional
wisdom says that legislative and agency bodies are better venues
for collecting information about social policy issues.‖191
While there are critics who maintain that any such protective
legislation would be inefficient and have a negative impact on
the economy, it is important to remember that ―[e]fficiency does
not always equate with justice.‖192 The time has come to rein in
what has been called the ―Wild West era of online privacy‖193
and protect individuals‘ personally identifiable information.
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